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I. ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
In the case of In re Van Huss' Petition' the Tennessee Supreme
Court denied an adoption under a literal interpretation of the resi-
dence requirements inserted into the adoption statutes in 1959.2
Under the 1959 statutes, although the petitioners in adoption pro-
ceedings were not required to make Tennessee their legal residence,
they were required to "have lived, maintained a home and been physi-
cally present in Tennessee, or on federal territory within the bound-
aries of Tennessee for one (1) year next preceding the filing of the
petition .... -
In the Van Huss case the petitioning husband met all of the other
requirements of the adoption statutes. He had lived in Tennessee all
of his life, and he and his wife maintained a residence within the
state. During the year preceding the filing of the petition, however,
he had been in naval service and had been stationed outside the
state, having visited the state only during short periods of leave. The
majority of the supreme court held that he did not meet the statutory
requirements for this reason and denied the adoption. The court
pointed out that adoption is entirely statutory in nature and that
there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements. 4 The
dissenting member of the court felt that the holding accomplished a
result wholly unintended by the legislature and that many residents
of the state who were temporarily called out of the state on business
would be disqualified by this interpretation of the statutes.5
The 1961 General Assembly revised the residence requirements so
*Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Trabue, Minick, Sturdi-
vant & Harbison, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 338 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1960).
2. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1959, ch. 223, §1.
3. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1959, ch. 223, §1.
4. Clements v. Morgan, 201 Tenn. 94, 296 S.W.2d 874 (1956).
5. 338 S.W.2d at 592.
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as to eliminate the problem of the Van Huss case. Thelnew statutes
require that the petitioners "shall have lived or maintained a regular
place of abode" in Tennessee or on a federal enclave within the state
during the year preceding the filing of the petition; and in addition
to using the disjunctive "or" and eliminating the requirement of
physical presence in the state, the amendment contains an express
provision that service personnel are not subject to the residence
requirement when stationed out of the state if they had lived or main-
tained a regular place of abode in Tennessee for one year prior to
entering the service.6
Several other changes were made in the adoption statutes by the
1961 General Assembly. The provisions regarding consent of natural
parents were amended so as to eliminate the requirement of a
guardian ad litem for an incompetent parent where, in a prior inde-
pendent proceeding, a welfare official or director of a licensed child-
placing agency had been appointed guardian of the person of the
subject child with authority to consent to the adoption.7
The provisions respecting surrender of children were amended so
that the person receiving a child under a direct surrender need not
be present to witness and accept the surrender, provided the receiving
person is related to the child as grandparent, aunt, uncle or step-
parent.8 Similarly where such a relative adopts a child, the court may
waive the order of reference, social investigation and report to the
court by the local welfare department or licensed agency, all of which
are required in ordinary adoption proceedings.9 Further amendments
permit the court to waive the interlocutory decree and probationary
period and to grant a final adoption where such a relative is the
adopting parent; in other cases the court is authorized to dispense with
the interlocutory decree and to grant final adoption when the child
has been in the adoptive home for one year.'0 The court is also au-
thorized to reveal to adopting parents the contents of adverse reports
submitted by the welfare department or licensed agency after an order
of reference."
In the case of Delamotte v. Stout12 the supreme court followed
earlier decisions to the effect that an adoption in another state creates
no greater rights than are conferred by local adoptions insofar as the
inheritance of property is concerned. 13 Under present Tennessee law
6. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-105 (Supp. 1961).
7. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-108 (Supp. 1961).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-114 (Supp. 1961)..
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-118 (Supp. 1961).
10. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-124 (Supp: 1961).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-118 (Supp. 1961).
12. 340 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn. 1960).
13. Finley v. Brown, 122 Tenn. 316, 123 S.W. 359 (1909).
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an adopted child apparently does not inherit from collateral relatives
of the adopting parent.14 Accordingly the court held that a child
adopted in Missouri would not be permitted to inherit Tennessee real
estate from a collateral relative of the adopting parent, despite ex-
press language of the Missouri statutes permitting such inheritance
in that state.. 5
II. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
In Thomas v. Thomas 6 the supreme court held that the obligation
of a father to support minor children under a divorce decree does not
terminate because visitation rights granted him are not honored by
the mother. The mother had been granted exclusive custody of the
children, and upon remarrying had moved with the children to an-
other state. The decree did not restrict her in this regard, nor was
the obligation to support made conditional upon the visitation privi-
leges. The decision is in accord with earlier Tennessee cases upon
the subject.'7
Although the power of the courts to enforce support decrees by
imprisonment for contempt has long been recognized, the 1961 Gen-
eral Assembly provided that such imprisonment might be in the
county workhouse instead of the county jail for periods up to six
months. 8 The apparent purpose of the amendment was to create a
deterrent to certain types of contemnors who might not object to a
jail sentence but who might find time spent in the workhouse less
satisfactory than working and supporting their dependents.1 9
In Kidd v. State ex rel. Moore20 the recurring problem of conflicting
jurisdiction of divorce courts and juvenile courts was again reviewed.
In this case the problem was rendered somewhat more complex be-
cause under private legislation in Knox County the juvenile and
domestic relations jurisdiction are combined in a single court.21 By
divorce decree in 1954 this court had granted custody of the subject
child to her mother. In 1955 the same judge, acting as a juvenile
court, declared the child delinquent and dependent and awarded her
custody temporarily to her grandmother. In 1960 the circuit court
of the county undertook to return the child to the mother. The mother
14. See Fey v. Cato, 197 Tenn. 583, 276 S.W.2d 734 (1955) and discussion of
the problem in Harbison, Domestic Relations-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND.
L. REv. 1004 (1955).
15. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 453.090 (Vernon 1952).
16. 335 S.W.2d 827 (Tenn. 1960).
17. Evans v. Evans, 125 Tenn. 112, 140 S.W. 745 (1911); Pendray v. Pendray,
35 Tenn. App. 284, 245 S.W.2d 204 (E.S. 1951).
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-835 (Supp. 1961).
19. Statement to the writer by one of the sponsors of the bill.
20. 338 S.W.2d 621 (Tenn. 1960).
21. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1925, ch. 634; Tenn. Priv. Acts 1913, ch. 277.
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thereupon filed habeas corpus proceedings in criminal court, which
held the 1955 juvenile decree void. In reversing, the supreme
court held that the Knox County Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court was one court and that it had power to enter the 1955 decree as
well as the earlier divorce and custody order. Once a juvenile court
finds a child delinquent or dependent, it has power to fix custody de-
spite a previous decree from a divorce court.22 Both under general
law23 and under the private acts involved in this case24 the jurisdic-
tion of a juvenile court continues throughout minority of the child.
Accordingly, no other court may interfere with a custody decree of a
juvenile court except in adoption proceedings. 25
III. DIVORCE AND ALIMONY
1. Grounds of Divorce.-The 1961 General Assembly modified the
divorce code with respect to desertion by reducing the period required
for divorce on this ground from two years to one year. 2
2. Venue of Actions.-Formerly the venue statutes permitted a
divorce action to be filed in the county where the defendant "is found,"
thereby making the action purely transitory in character. The 1961.
General Assembly deleted this provision, so that venue is now limited
to the county where the parties last resided as husband and wife or
the county of the defendant's residence, except in cases of nonresident
defendants.27 Since venue in divorce cases does not affect the juris-
diction of the court, however, and may be waived,28 it still may be
possible for the parties by consent or by waiver to fix venue in
counties other than those prescribed by the statutes. If the General
Assembly desired to convert the action into an entirely local one,
more specific legislation would seem to be required.
3. Effective Date of Decree.-In the case of McCown v. Quillin9
the validity of a second marriage depended upon the effective date of
a prior divorce. A husband was granted a divorce in chancery court
22. Marmino v. Marmino, 34 Tenn. App. 352, 238 S.W.2d 105 (W.S. 1950).
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-263 (1956).
24. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1913, ch. 277, § 9.
25. In re Matthews, 204 Tenn. 155, 319 S.W.2d 69 (1958), discussed in
Harbison, Domestic Relations-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1183
(1959). In the present case there had apparently been some attempt at
adoption of the child, and these proceedings seem to have been the source of
the circuit court order in 1960. The adoption petition, however, had been
dismissed, and the record on appeal in the present case did not reveal the
details of the proceedings.
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-801 (Supp. 1961).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-804 (Supp. 1961).
28. Kelley v. Kelley, 195 Tenn. 649, 263 S.W.2d 505 (1953); Brown v. Brown,
155 Tenn. 530, 296 S.W. 356 (1927).
29. 344 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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on the morning of June 9, 1953, and he remarried that same after-
noon. The clerk noted the ruling of the court on his docket, but a
formal decree was not entered on the minutes until June 17, 1953.
This decree recited that the cause had been heard on June 9. Both
the trial court and the court of appeals in the present case held that
the divorce decree was effective from the date when the decision was
rendered, rather than from the date when the decree was entered on
the minutes. The appellate court also approved the entry of a decree
nunc pro tunc in the divorce case so as to provide expressly that the
minutes of the divorce court should speak as of June 9, 1953. Although
somewhat liberal, these holdings are supported by earlier cases 30 and
are consistent with the general policy of upholding the validity of
marriages whenever possible.3' There is, of course, no provision in
Tennessee law prohibiting remarriage until a specified time shall
have elapsed, and divorced persons are free to remarry at any time
unless there has been a violation of the "paramour" statutes.3 2 Possibly
a statute prescribing the time for remarriage following divorce would
help eliminate the problem presented in the foregoing case.
4. Alimony in Solido.-In Smith v. Smith3 3 the divorce court had
awarded the wife as alimony the interest of her husband in two tracts
of land. She had been required to assume certain indebtedness there-
on and to pay her own counsel fees and certain other obligations. The
husband insisted that the award was excessive, contending that the
wife had been allowed approximately two-thirds of his entire estate.
After affirming the divorce decree on the merits, the court of appeals
reviewed the alimony award and concluded that it should not be dis-
turbed. The amount and type of alimony are largely discretionary
with the trial court, and in this instance the award was not deemed
disproportionate in view of the ages of the parties, the size of their
estates, and in view of the fact that no future alimony payments
would be required of the husband.
5. Contempt Decrees.-For many years a highly technical rule has
been followed in Tennessee with respect to contempt decrees for
nonpayment of alimony and support. A number of cases have held
that a contempt decree is void if it does not contain on its face a
finding that the defendant had ability to make the required pay-
ments.3 4 In the case of Leonard v. Leonard,35 however, the supreme
30. See Jackson v. Jarratt, 165 Tenn. 76, 52 S.W.2d 137 (1932); Rush v. Rush,
97 Tenn. 279, 37 S.W. 13 (1896).
31. Cole v. Parton, 172 Tenn. 8, 108 S.W.2d 884 (1937); Rutledge v. Rutledge,
41 Tenn. App. 158, 293 S.W.2d 21 (W.S. 1953).
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-831 (1956).
33. 339 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
34. Chappell v. Chappell, 37 Tenn. App. 242, 261 S.W.2d 824 (W.S. 1952);
1276 [ VOL. 14
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court reviewed the question and overruled the earlier cases. It pointed
out that the barlier rule is in accord with good practice but held that
the absence of such a finding in the decree does not affect the validity
of the decree. The court noted that contempt proceedings of this na-
ture are not summary in character but are heard on pleadings and
proof. Review is by appeal, not by habeas corpus. Accordingly there
is a record for the appellate court to examine, and the record should
reveal whether the defendant had ability to pay and whether he
was properly adjudged to be in contempt. Lack of a recital in the
decree, therefore, is immaterial and should not render the decree void.
The holding seems sound and eliminates a needless technicality which
previously existed.
IV. PARENT AND CHMLD
1. Actions for Loss of Services.-In Whitley v. Hix37 a question was
raised as to whether both parents must join as plaintiffs in an action
for loss of services of a minor child. Certain statutes provide generally
that parents are "joint natural guardians" of their children and that
they are jointly charged with their care and jointly entitled to their
earnings.3 There are, however, express provisions entitling the
father to maintain the action for loss of services and giving the
mother this right when the father is dead or has deserted the family.
39
The supreme court held that the specific statutes govern, and that the
father may maintain the action alone in the ordinary case. The hold-
ing seems correct, and it is in accord with the generally accepted prac-
tice and procedure in the state.
2. Illegitimate Child as Dependent.-In a case of first impression,
and one that must be regarded as approaching the limits of liberality,
the supreme court held that an illegitimate child-born six months
after the death of its father-was a "dependent" within the meaning
of the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act.4 0 The court relied
upon the fact that under existing law the father of an illegitimate is
liable for the necessary support and maintenance of the child.41 Such
child, therefore, is to be deemed a "dependent" when paternity is estab-
lished or conceded, as it appeared to be in the present case.
Loy v. Loy, 32 Tenn. App. 470, 222 S.W.2d 873 (W.S. & M.S. 1949); Crowder
v. Hayse, 9 Tenn. App. 55 (W.S. 1928). See Harbison, Domestic Relations-
1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REv. 835, 839 (1954).
35. 341 S.W.2d 740 (Tenn. 1960).
36. State ex rel. Wright v. Upchurch, 194 Tenn. 657, 254 S.W.2d 748 (1953).
37. 343 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. 1961).
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-101 (1956).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-105 (1956).
40. Shelley v. Central Woodwork, Inc., 340 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. .1960).
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-223 (Supp. 1961).
127719611
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Previous cases under the compensation law had required a showing
of actual dependency before an illegitimate child could qualify for
death benefits.42 Because of subsequent changes in the general law
concerning the liability of the father of an illegitimate, however, the
court felt that the earlier decisions were distinguishable. The effect
of the holding seems to be to equate paternity with dependency al-
though the statutory definitions of dependents in the compensation
law do not go so far.
V. CONTRACTS OF MINORS
Another unusually liberal holding during the survey period is
found in Harwell Motor Co. v. Cunningham.43 There a minor, nineteen
years of age, purchased an automobile. He kept the car for almost
two years. Twice after reaching his majority he executed mortgages
and notes to refinance the purchase price. The signed contract of
sale contained a representation that he was twenty-one years of age.
Nevertheless both the trial and appellate courts permitted the minor
to rescind the purchase after reaching his majority and to recover the
entire purchase price paid.
The court found that the execution of the two mortgages after
attaining majority was not a ratification of the contract. This finding
was predicated upon the fact that the purchaser was merely "refinan-
cing" and the court felt that this did not indicate any intention to be
bound by the terms of the contract. As to the written misrepresenta-
tion of age, the court found from other evidence that the seller had
actual knowledge of the minority and therefore declined to permit an
estoppel of the minor.
In the last analysis the court of appeals conceded that the decision
reached went somewhat "against the grain."44 One member of the
court dissented without opinion. More than anything else, the case
points up anew the hazards inherent in business dealings with minors,
but a reading of the opinion leaves serious doubt as to the result
reached in this particular instance.
VI. MARRIAGE
1. Family Immunity-Effect of Annulment.-The interesting ques-
tion of the effect of annulment of marriage upon the rules of family
immunity in tort was reviewed in Gordon v. Pollard.45 The marriage
42. Sanders v. Fork Ridge Coal & Coke Co., 158 Tenn. 145, 299 S.W. 795
(1927).
43. 337 S.W.2d 765 (TennApp. M.S. 1959).
44. 337 S.W.2d at 769.
45. 336 S.W.2d 25 (Tenn. 1960).
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of a young couple had been annulled for non-age. Prior to the annul-
ment, however, the wife had been injured in an automobile accident,
allegedly because of negligent driving by the husband. After the
annulment was obtained, she sued her former husband for the
injuries sustained in the accident, joining his parents as defendants
under the "family purpose" doctrine. Both the trial court and the
supreme court held that the action would not lie. Tennessee, of course,
is firmly committed to the doctrine of family immunity.46 While
annulment of marriage for many purposes is said to "relate back" to
the inception of the marriage, the supreme court pointed out that
this fictional rule is not applied for all purposes, even between the
parties to the marriage. During the period while the marriage sub-
sisted, the parties did occupy the status of husband and wife. Given
the rule of family immunity, the holding seems correct, and it is
supported by decisions from other jurisdictions.47
2. Restraints on Marriage.-The nice distinctions between a "condi-
tion subsequent" and a "conditional limitation" as developed in real
property cases dealing with restraint upon the right of marriage were
reviewed in Harbin v. Judd.48 In that case certain realty had been
deeded in trust for a group of brothers and sisters. The deed provided
that "upon the marriage of any of said beneficiaries or equitable
owners, his or her interest shall vest in and become the property
equally of the unmarried sisters or sister, during her or their
unmarried state ... ." There was a provision re-vesting the respective
interests of the beneficiaries "upon the marriage of the last unmarried
sister." The evidence showed that this family group had inherited
certain funds from their mother and that these funds were invested
in the realty to provide a home for the children. The above deed was
approved in chancery proceedings in 1901, and the record in that case
showed that the purpose of the above provisions was to insure a home
for the children and to prevent the independent action of one of them
from disturbing the others. Gradually all of the members of the fam-
ily married or died. Upon the death of the last unmarried sister in 1957
the question of the devolution of title to the property was presented.
In declaratory judgment and partition proceedings, the chancellor held
that the provisions of the deed were void as being unlawful restraints
upon the right of marriage. The court of appeals reversed. It pointed
out that the provisions were unquestionably inserted for a proper pur-
46. Prince v. Prince, 205 Tenn. 451, 326 S.W.2d 908 (1959); see Harbison,
Domestic Relations-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. Rnv. 1121, 1127
(1960).
47. Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d
637 (1948).
48. 340 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1960).
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pose. They had been agreed to by all of the adult members of the fam-
ily and approved by the chancery court on behalf of the minors. The
family had used the property for over half a century under the terms
of the instrument. -The court held that the restrictive provisions
constituted merely conditional limitations upon the duration of the
estate conveyed in trust and did not work a forfeiture as a condition
subsequent. The distinction between these concepts, although having
little basis in logic, is firmly imbedded in the law. The courts have
frequently used it as a means of upholding provisions which, although
tending incidentally to restrain marriage, have some other primary
and proper purpose.4 9 In the present case the court of appeals indi-
cated strongly that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a pro-
vision of this sort should be a controlling factor in determining
whether the provision should be allowed to stand.
49. Annot., 122 A.L.R. 7, 41 (1939); 35 Am. JuR. Marriage § 258 (1941).
